state acts as a market participant when it buys and sells goods and thereby takes on attributes of a private business.' In such cases, a state may freely "determine those with whom it will deal, and [] fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." '7 Acting as market participants, states have, for example, made it more lucrative to sell scrap autos to in-state than to out-of-state processors 8 and forced out-of-state customers for state-produced cement to wait until all in-state buyers were satisfied. 9 Lower courts currently disagree over whether local preference statutes should be treated as instances of market participation or as instances of states impermissibly imposing a preference on autonomous entities. The Seventh Circuit voided an Illinois law requiring contractors on any public works project to hire only Illinois laborers, 10 but the Third and Ninth Circuits have upheld similarlystructured laws as forms of market participation."
This disagreement reflects an uncertainty about the market participant exception itself. Current doctrine offers little direction to courts that must apply the exception. The Supreme Court has not yet identified criteria which reliably identify when states are acting as market participants. Lacking such criteria, courts often look to the "market participant" label itself for guidance. But the label is misleading; it does not adequately describe the dimensions of the exception.
This Comment offers a pragmatic conception of the market participant exception: state exemption from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny should be limited to those actions available to a private party in the marketplace. Such a limitation denies states the means to regulate in a discriminatory way. Every private party acting in the marketplace faces, at a minimum, two constraints: 1) it cannot regulate 2 and 2) it is subject to the antitrust laws.' 3 If a state is neither regulating nor taking action that would violate the than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities." Id at 93.
' Reeves, Inc. v Stake, 447 US 429, 439 n 12 (1980).
antitrust laws if carried out by a private party, then the state's action will not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Under this "private-party" test, whether a local preference statute is constitutional will depend on the relationship between a state and its subdivisions. A private party may adopt a preference itself but may not impose the preference on other actors either by regulating or by exploiting its market power in violation of the antitrust laws. Under the private-party conception, then, if the state and its subdivisions are independent entities, a state-imposed preference may become an instance of market regulation. 1 4 But where, as a matter of state law, a state and its subdivisions must be deemed the same actor, a preference statute should be seen as an example of market participation, exempt from the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Section I of this Comment describes the sweep of local preference laws and their unsettled status under the market participant exception. Section II presents and justifies the private-party definition of "market participation." Section IH applies the privateparty test to local preference statutes, in the process revisiting the decisions of the Courts of Appeals. This analysis indicates that local preference statutes are not per se unconstitutional.
IS The "private party" used for comparison purposes in this Comment is subject to the antitrust laws even though private parties are, in some instances, immune from antitrust. See, for example, U.S. (1984) (policy allowing only waste generated by county residents to be dumped in county landfill falls within the market participant exception; the policy "does not restrict the disposal of [out-of-state] waste in any other landfill that might be constructed within the County").
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I. LOCAL PREFERENCE STATUTES AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
A. Local Preference Statutes
States use a wide variety of mechanisms to further their instate preferences. 15 A 1992 survey found only six states that applied no formal resident preference. 1 " Most commonly, states use local preferences in "tie-bid" situations: when an in-state and outof-state resident each submit bids at equal cost, the state awards the contract to the resident. 17 States may also impose a percentage preference: when comparing contract bids, the state discounts the price of in-state bids by a set percentage. 18 Other states apply reciprocal preferences which handicap out-of-state bidders to the same extent that their own states prefer local bidders." 9
B. Existing Doctrine: The Market Participant Exception
The market participant exception reflects the Supreme Court's desire to protect states' autonomy, 0 even at some cost to the national economy. 21 At the same time, the Court has taken steps to keep the market participant exception from swallowing the dormant Commerce Clause rule. 1. An exception for market participants.
The dormant Commerce Clause bars states from advancing "their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state .... "-22 Regardless of a state's ultimate purpose, it may not discriminate "against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. 23 State regulations that achieve or aim toward simple economic protectionism face a "virtually per se rule of invalidity. however, a plurality of the Court rejected an Alaska requirement that any timber taken from state lands be processed within the state prior to export. According to the Court, Alaska could not use its leverage in the timber market "to exert a regulatory effect in the processing market, in which it is not a participant." 30 Otherwise, the market participant exception would simply swallow the rule that "[s]tates may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local industry. 2. The difficulty of identifying "market participants."
While the term "market participation" provides a distinctive label for the Commerce Clause immunity set forth in Hughes, the label is unhelpful. The Supreme Court has itself struggled to treat successive cases consistently, appearing to rely as much on its evolving "intuition" as on any concrete standard. 2 Notably, each author of the Court's market participant opinions dissented in the next. 3 As a result, courts and commentators continue to search for the precise contours of the market participant exception. 3 While the Supreme Court ostensibly relies on a distinction between impermissible "regulation" and permissible "participation," 3 5 this distinction is purely formal and, alone, provides little practical guidance to lower courts. Moreover, the Court has not provided criteria which lower courts could use to distinguish regulation from participation. For 40 There, the state granted Georgia farmers a preference in leasing the prime selling areas at a stateowned farmer's market. 41 The Smith court held that the state had regulated the market in "produce sales, 42 but the dissenting opinion argued that Georgia had simply acted in the leasing market. 43 Until the Supreme Court provides guidance, courts will continue to identify relevant markets differently. 44 Even if courts can properly characterize the markets in which states participate, courts must then decide whether the states have a "substantial regulatory effect" beyond these markets. 45 Once again, the Court has failed to offer a readily accessible basis for making this determination.
Recently 46 observed that when a private party (the paradigmatic proprietor) participates "in a boycott of a supplier on the basis of a labor policy concern rather than a profit motive," the party in fact seeks to "regulate" the target of the boycott. Therefore, the Court reasoned, a state which employs boycott tactics in order to affect conduct unrelated to a party's "performance of contractual obligations to the State" should be deemed a regulator rather than a market participant. 47 However, this analysis ill suits the market participant exception.
The Court has held that a state may require that its trading partners hire at least fifty percent local workers, 4 8 or refuse to trade with out-of-state parties until all local customers are satisfied. 4e To the extent that such policies resemble boycotts, they "regulate" the conduct of the state's trading partners in the manner suggested by Building Trades Council. But the Court held these policies to be forms of market participation-not "regulation."
For the Building Trades Council framework to apply, then, a party's performance of her contractual obligations to the state " Id at 1083, 1085. 3 Id at 1087 (Randall dissenting). 4 As an example of the Court's inconsistent signals, White held that states may impose conditions beyond "the boundary of formal privity of contract"-so long as actual privity exists. White, 460 US at 211 n 7. Yet the Wunnicke plurality suggested that Commerce Clause restraints might arise within the boundary of formal privity and urged that the relevant market be "relatively narrowly defined." 467 US at 97-98.
' Furthermore, market participant cases often present facts which are "subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis....
[T]he adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress .... " Reeves, 447 US at 439. Preference statutes require states to strike a precise balance between competing interests. States must conserve tax dollars and at the same time satisfy constituents' desires for state contracts. Graduated percentage-preference statutes demonstrate the degree to which states fine-tune these calculations: Alaska's preferences vary between 3, 5, and 7%; Hawaii's between 3, 5, and 10%. NASPO Survey, Table 43 (cited in note 16).
Bypassing the difficulty.
The difficulties inherent in the market participant/market regulator distinction have frustrated many observers, who have sought alternatives to the Court's ambiguous doctrine. Some commentators argue that dormant Commerce Clause cases can be resolved by scrutinizing states' motives. 5 4 The Supreme Court, however, has expressly ignored considerations of state motive in its market participation analysis.
5 5 Some litigants have tried to avoid the Commerce Clause issue by challenging resident preference policies on other constitutional grounds, including the Privileges and Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses. Such challenges have met with mixed success. Similarly, Justice Blackmun's argument that the preference at issue in White was simply "parochial favoritism" did not sway the Court. 460 US at 223 (Blackmun dissenting). Authority, 5 which dispensed with the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of state immunity from federal regulation. 59 However, the Court recently affirmed the use of a regulator/ proprietor distinction in analyzing the preemption of state laws by federal regulation." And in three cases since Garcia, the Supreme Court has recognized the continuing validity of the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause." 1 As a result, courts must continue to apply a market participant exception, even if unsure of its actual nature. Case law on local preference statutes reflects this uncertainty and suggests the need for a clearer approach to the exception. that Pennsylvania acted as a market participant when it required that all its political subdivisions purchase products containing only U.S.-made steel. The court found that Pennsylvania's local government units "exist only through affirmative acts of the state." 66 Therefore, the court saw "no reason why, attendant on making such affirmative grants of power, the Commonwealth may not also restrict the contracting authority of such local bodies." 67 Since Pennsylvania had displaced the purchasing discretion of its political subdivisions, the state and its subdivisions could be considered a single purchaser.
Similarly In fact, such case-specific inquiries are necessary. Otherwise, courts run a significant risk of misapplying the market participant exception. States' preference policies can be expected to vary from state-to-state; this, in itself, does not raise dormant Commerce Clause concerns.7 2 And as W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country illustrate, the degree of autonomy of a state's subdivisions affects the extent to which a state may extend the scope of its preference policies. Therefore, the particular features of individual states' local government law can be expected to affect the constitutionality of individual local preference statutes. The market participant exception should therefore be restated in a manner that ensures that courts treating local preference statutes will properly account for such local variation.
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION RESTATED
A. The Private-Party Test
This Comment argues that "market participation" should be defined as those state actions which could legally be undertaken by a private party acting in the market. This definition offers courts a framework more workable than the Supreme Court's regulator/participant distinction. Using a private-party test for states' Commerce Clause immunity may better prevent states from imposing conditions "that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market." 3 Rather than requiring a state to mimic a private party, the private-party test asks whether a private party could mimic the state. Under this test, states can choose their trading partners in a manner as biased-but no more biased-than could private parties.7 4 71 Id (emphasis in original). The court also noted that " [a] rule that would consider all political subdivisions as separate from state control for market participant purposes would be anomalous to the proposition that political subdivisions exist at the will of the state." Id. The note advocates a private-party measure of market participation, with several modifications. It argues that the market participant exception should encompass only those cases where the state acts "in the form, and with the intent and impact, of an economically rational private market force." ' 7 Further, the state should also be required to show that its preference has "a sound economic basis, considering the state as a private entity, without regard to the potential or actual economic benefits to its citizens." The state preference should create an economic benefit likely to exceed the benefits obtainable from pursuing nondiscriminatory alternatives. e However, the "sound economic basis" ' requirement and the monitoring of states' intentions advocated in the Duke Law Journal note are more prescriptive than workable under current conditions. Courts can rarely, if ever, second-guess a legislative determination that a particular course of action had a "sound economic basis." 8 0 And where the Court confers market participant status, even an overtly protectionist motive becomes irrelevant. 8 1 1991) ("a regulation or statute may be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge, but that same regulation may still be held to violate the Privileges & Immunities Clause"). The private-party test looks to the antitrust laws 2 to ensure that states do not abuse their market powers in the guise of "market participants." It does not, however, substitute antitrust liability for dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Instead, the privateparty test refers to antitrust law to help determine when dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny would be appropriate. Under the private-party test, if a state takes actions that would violate the antitrust laws if undertaken by a private party, the state would be subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Thus, states would be prevented from using monopoly power or vertical restraints of trade to achieve the sort of "substantial regulatory effect" forbidden by Wunnicke 5 s A number of courts and commentators have already used antitrust principles to limit the market participant exception.
8 4 For example, Justice White relied on an antitrust analogy in holding that the preference at issue in Wunnicke had an overly "regulatory effect." 8 5 Likewise, in Western Oil and Gas Association v Cory," e the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the market participant exception since California's Lands Commission had "a complete monopoly over the sites" being leased. 
US at 97.
For example, Kovacs and Anderson propose that the market participant exception should be bounded by considerations of "fairness or evenhandedness." Kovacs and Anderson, 18 Envir L at 808 (cited in note 37). To the extent that states can claim antitrust immunity while acting as market participants, the "fairness" principle would then invoke the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. Otherwise, the authors warn, "the state as a market participant can provide any service in a manner that eliminates competi- Notably, the doctrine of state action antitrust immunity set forth in Parker v Brown 8 s does not affect the private-party test's use of antitrust principles to define the scope of the market participant exception. The Court has suggested that Parker immunity does not apply to states acting as market participants. 89 Also, bear in mind that the Commerce Clause doctrine and the antitrust doctrine are independent of one another. Parker immunity reflects the congressional intent underlying the Sherman Act."' In contrast, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine reflects the Court's understanding of the economic policies underlying the Commerce Clause. 91 In Reeves, the Court affirmed South Dakota's policy of giving residents a priority in sales from the state's cement factory. The Court itself noted "the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." s Unsurprisingly, Reeves then recognized that "the Commerce Clause places no limitations on a State's refusal to deal with particular parties when it is participating in the interstate market in goods. '94 Nor did any abuses of market power present themselves. No entry barriers kept private parties from beginning to manufacture their own cement; the Court rejected the argument that South Dakota had supplanted the free market for cement as both "simplistic and speculative. ' 9 5 In contrast, the preference at issue in Wunnicke, if pursued by a private party, could well be characterized as a "classic example of the tying arrangement." 9 6 The tie appears unlawful since it forced purchasers to have their lumber resawed in-state even though, absent the tie, "absolutely no market for domestic resawing" existed. 7 Thus, the Wunnicke preference does not qualify as "mar- -15 (1984-85) . In general, "the vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in another, regardless of the source from which the power is derived and whether the power ket participation." And, falling back on traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court then rejected the preference as an instance of overt protectionism. e8
III. LocAL PREFERENCE STATUTES AS "PRIVATE-PARTY" ACTION
Under the private-party test, local preference statutes will not automatically violate the dormant Commerce Clause. A local preference statute will satisfy the Commerce Clause under two conditions: 1) the preference must be a choice of trading partners that a private party could make, and 2) the choice must only govern the state's own transactions. Since local preference statutes impose a preference on a state's political subdivisions, whether a state can satisfy the second condition will depend upon the degree of autonomy its subdivisions enjoy-a matter of state law.
A. A State May Prefer Its Residents
Generally, a local preference is a choice available to private parties. A private contractor can choose to "hire local" if it so desires. Similarly, a private consumer could buy local or "buy American"-decisions that are commonly made. Consumers may even organize boycotts if they so desire. 99 Against this backdrop, the courts in W. Even if a "preference" is valid, the dormant Commerce Clause may bar the state from imposing the preference on its subdivisions. 102 The limitations that apply to private parties-the antitrust laws and the inability to engage in traditional regulation-suggest the following principle: private parties may not impose their market preferences on others. The private-party test applies this principle to local preference statutes, suggesting that such statutes will violate the Commerce Clause unless the state and its subdivisions are the same "participant." Whether this is so will depend upon the legal relationship between a state and its subdivisions, a relationship which varies from state to state.
Legal relationship of state and subdivision.
Since the status of political subdivisions is a matter of state law, 03 subdivisions' autonomy may be expected to vary significantly. Unless courts make state-specific inquiries in local preference statute cases, they must settle for the imprecision of generalized doctrines of local government.'" According to such doctrines, 
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10 5
Many states, however, have abrogated the constitutional structure which underlies* this doctrine. 1 0 And the sheer number and variety of local government entities-over 80,000 in 19901°0 -strongly suggest that even within a single state, a simple rule of thumb will not cover all local preference contingencies. Thus, the blanket assertions characterizing the relationships between the states and subdivisions in W.C.M., Trojan and Big Country were inappropriate. 10 8 Their cursory treatment of these state law issues is surprising. Federal courts frequently account for variations in state local government law in analogous situations, such as Parker antitrust immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity and diversity jurisdiction. a) Antitrust immunity of local governments. Parker immunity extends to a state's political subdivisions only when they act pursuant to a state policy of displacing competition.' 0 " The greater the political subdivision's autonomy, the more specific the state's authorization of anticompetitive activity must be in order for Parker immunity to apply to the subdivision. 110 This inquiry Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the General Assembly, to determine their local affairs and government
The rule or proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state. Note that at the same time that Iowa abrogated Dillon's rule, it left open the possibility that state laws will automatically preempt local ordinances "inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly. . . ." Id. 107 Richard Briffault, Our Localism' Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum L Rev 346, 348-56 (1990) (noting the disparities between, for example, cities and suburbs).
108 See W.C.M., 730 F2d at 495 ("for many purposes... every local government unit in Illinois is a part of the state government; but maybe not for the purpose of evaluating Illinois' preference law under the commerce clause"); Big Country, 952 F2d at 1179 ("Political subdivisions generally exist at the will of the state."). turns on a construction of state law. A local entity acts as an agent of the state when the state's grant of authority to act indicates "that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of." 1 11 Subdivisions "must do more than merely produce an authorization to 'do business' to show that the state's policy is to displace competition.1 11 2
Of course, Parker immunity is not perfectly analogous to the market participant exception. 11 3 A subdivision can obtain Parker immunity while remaining an independent entity; 114 the state's authorization of an anticompetitive policy does no more than offer the subdivision an option without requiring the subdivision to pursue the policy. " 5 In contrast, a state cannot constitutionally subject an independent subdivision to a local preference statute. 223 Note that the political-subdivision aspect of Parker immunity is discussed only as an illustration of federal courts' use of state law of local government. This is not intended to suggest that the view of local government entities under the Parker doctrine should control in market participant cases. As discussed in text at notes 88-91, the policies underlying Parker immunity are wholly distinct from those underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. Board of Education v Doyle 11 6 presented the issue whether a local board of education would be treated as an arm of the State, protected by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or as an independent political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend. The Court based its holding, in part, "upon the nature of the entity created by state law.
1 17 Because Ohio law excluded school districts from the "State," no sovereign immunity attached." 8 The Supreme Court has required the same inquiry for determining diversity jurisdiction. In Moor v Alameda County, 1 1 the Court considered whether diversity jurisdiction lay in an action brought by an Illinois citizen against a California county for injuries suffered when a deputy sheriff wrongfully fired his shotgun. The Court held that "a political subdivision of a State, unless it is simply 'the arm or alter ego of the State,' is a citizen of the State for diversity purposes." 1 20 To determine whether the county could properly be considered "an arm of the state," the Moor Court conducted a "detailed examination" of California law and found "persuasive indicia of the independent status occupied by California counties relative to the State of California. 2. Dillon's rule, home rule, and local autonomy.
The relationships between states and their political subdivisions fall along a range between dependence and independence. At one end of the range, some state laws view political subdivisions as no more than creations of state government. As such, the subdivisions' powers can be modified or withdrawn at the state's discretion." 2 2 This principle is known as "Dillon's rule. ' 194, 199 (1929) . 121 Id at 719-20 (citing the array of powers granted to the county: to sue and be sued, levy taxes, sell or hold property, provide a variety of public services, and issue bonds). Alameda County argued unsuccessfully that diversity did not exist because Alameda was an agent of the state, which is not deemed a person for diversity purposes. tonomy provided varies widely from state to state, the grant of this autonomy is generally labelled home rule.
Where Dillon's rule governs a state's relations with its subdivisions, the private-party test would suggest that a local preference statute does not violate the Commerce Clause. When political subdivisions are deemed mere creatures of the state, purchases made by political subdivisions become, effectively, the purchases of the state-not the purchases of autonomous entities. As the Trojan court noted, in such cases the suppliers for a local public entity could be thought of as "supplying for the state." 12 Home rule provisions mitigate the effects of Dillon's rule by empowering subdivisions to manage their own local affairs, free of interference from the state legislature. 125 Home rule serves two purposes: it is a source of local authority, and it may limit the power of the state legislature over its subdivisions.
126 By 1989, thirty-seven states had adopted some form of home rule, 127 and these provisions bring specific state/subdivision relationships into sharp focus. The variance among states' home rule regimes defeats any generalizations regarding local preference statutes. In addition, the presence of a home rule provision will not, by itself, guarantee local autonomy; such provisions can be nullified through actual usage. 28 To assess whether a matter is of statewide interest or falls within the scope of local affairs requires a fact-specific, state-bystate analysis. 2 9 Under this approach, an out-of-state plaintiff can successfully challenge a political subdivision's adherence to a local preference statute only in those cases where the subdivision itself could successfully challenge the statute as a violation of its home rule status 124 Trojan, 916 F2d at 911. See also Big Country, 952 F2d at 1179 ("a state should not be penalized for exercising its power through smaller, localized units").
125 For a description and discussion of home rule provisions generally, see Antieau, 1 Municipal Corporation Law § § 3.00 et seq (cited in note 106).
"22 Id § 3.01. Home rule may arise in any of 3 ways: a self-executing constitutional provision which designates the authority to manage local affairs as a power inherent in localities; a statutory grant of local home rule power; or the local adoption of a home rule charter pursuant to a state constitution. Id § § 3.01-3.03(1). under state law. 130 Moreover, if a home rule entity is properly considered an arm of the state for purposes of market participant analysis, so, too, should any other political subdivisions vested with lesser authority. The impact of local preference statutes on home rule entities thus provides a convenient test for determining whether a local preference statute should be seen as market participation, or as a form of regulation. 13 1 Here, the home rule provisions of the states at issue in W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country are considered in turn.
In W.C.M., Judge Posner argued that "[t]he difference between the state's preferring state residents in its own dealings and forcing local agencies to do so in theirs is both analytical and quantitative." 3 2 Since the state had imposed a preference on "a unit of local government without any state financial support or supervision," and the bulk of public contracting takes place at the local level,' 3 3 Posner withheld market participant status.
However, Illinois law supports a different result. In People ex rel Bernardi v Highland Park, 3 4 the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that the Illinois preference statute superseded the local autonomy of home rule entities. Highland Park concerned a home rule municipality's attempt to skirt the requirements of the statewide Prevailing Wage Act. The court held that since the Act addressed "statewide" issues, "Highland Park's attempt to abrogate the prevailing wage law was an act ultra vires, being outside the grant of home rule power .... " 5 Instead, "Highland Park had no choice but to comply with the statute's requirements.' 3 6 In determining that the Prevailing Wage Act was a matter of statewide concern, the Highland Park court drew an analogy to the Illinois 130 Of course, if this challenge fails, the out-of-state plaintiff 'might still prevail by showing the preference policy to be generically invalid. See Section llI.A.
"'1 See Doreen J. Piligian, Resident Preference Laws and the Award of Public Contracts, 10 Construc L 10 (May 1990). Piligian notes that while political subdivisions have been described as "mere creatures of the state," many are in fact governed by home rule charters. Id at 23. In such cases, Piligian asserts, local preference statutes may restrain local decisionmaking and burden local funds-a form of regulation rather than market participation. Id. However, a more detailed analysis is required since, as argued above, home rule provisions in fact provide highly variable degrees of.local autonomy.
132 730 F2d at 496.
13
Id.
134 121 IMI 2d 1, 15-17, 520 NE2d 316, 322-23 (1988) . 135 Id at 16. 136 Id at 5. local preference statute, which, the court found, also addressed statewide issues.
Reconsidering W.C.M. in light of Highland Park, it appears that the Illinois Preference Act left the state's subdivisions no power to contract in any way other than in conformance with the Preference Act. In other words, the municipality acted not as an independent actor subject to an imposed preference, but rather as an arm of the state. Under this view, the Preference Act should have been upheld.
In disagreeing with W.C.M., the Trojan court relied principally on its assessment of local autonomy. Under Pennsylvania law, "the local bodies covered by the statute exist only by grace of state authority . ".. ,,'Is The court saw "no reason why, attendant on making such affirmative grants of authority, the Commonwealth may not also restrict the contracting power of such local bodies." 1 " 9 No basis remained to distinguish preferences imposed on central state agencies-which "certainly would be permitted"-from similar restrictions imposed on local bodies.°R eference to Pennsylvania's home rule provisions buttresses the soundness of the Trojan court's holding. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, "[a] municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time." '14 This language designates the scope of home rule authority but also permits the state legislature to control local affairs by passing acts which affect both general and local concerns. This weak form of local autonomy supports the Trojan court's readiness to view localities as simple arms of the state for purposes of the preference statute. Indeed, the court cited Pennsylvania Were home rule authorities allowed to govern their local labor conditions, the [Illinois] Constitution's vision of home rule units exercising their powers to solve local problems would be corrupted and that power used to create a confederation of modem feudal estates which, to placate local economic and political expediencies, would in time destroy the General Assembly's carefully crafted and balanced economic policies. It is precisely for this reason, to avoid a chaotic and ultimately ineffective labor policy, that the State has a far more vital interest in regulating labor conditions than do local communities. Id at 16. I" Trojan, 916 F2d at 911. 13 Id. 140 Id.
" Pa Const, Art IX, § 2.
cases detailing the subordinate status of local subdivisions. 142 In sum, the court held that the suppliers of local subdivisions were in effect "supplying for the state.
143
In Big Country, the Ninth Circuit followed Trojan, holding that'a state preference statute controlling the purchases of local school districts fell within the market-participant exception. 144 However, the Big Country court paid only cursory attention to the issue of local government law presented by the case before it. Arguing that political subdivisions "exist at the will of the state," the court chose to view them as simple arms of the state for purposes of market participant analysis. Notably, the Big Country court reached its holding without any reference to Alaska law. Instead, the court relied on another Ninth Circuit case dealing with California law, Trojan, and a hornbook on local government which mentioned the general rule of "complete control" by various states over their subdivisions. 46 That the court was satisfied by this authority reflects its reluctance to look to Alaska law to determine the actual status of the school board.'17 Yet had it done so, the Big Country court could have furnished a more robust basis for its holding.
The Alaska Constitution provides that home rule boroughs or cities "may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.' 1 48 This apparently broad language is in practice tempered by the facility with which legislative powers may be removed from the cities. The Supreme Court of Alaska has held that even a broad construction of home rule powers cannot defeat the provisions of a state statute "expressly made applicable to home rule municipalities .... Indeed, the Alaska preference statute considered in Big Country singled out schools receiving state funds, requiring that they observe a local preference when buying dairy products.
1 5 0 In the face of such specificity, the school boards' autonomy and delegated power fell away, as envisioned by the Alaska constitution. Thereafter, the subdivisions in question served as arms of the state for purchasing purposes.
The disagreement among these cases is not so much a "split" on the meaning of the market participant exception, but the result of the difficulty in applying the exception. Lacking firmly-established criteria for applying the exception, the courts have adopted inconsistent approaches. By encouraging courts to give proper consideration to the inherent variations in state law, the private-party test provides a more reliable basis for evaluating local preference statutes.
Although, under the private-party test, the local preference statutes at issue in W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country all appear valid, this does not mean that home rule provisions present no obstacle to the validity of local preference statutes. For example, the California Constitution provides that home rule municipalities shall have autonomous control over "municipal affairs. ' 15 Under California law, "municipal affairs" include "[tihe expenditure of a city's funds on [public works] projects and the rates of pay of the workers whom it hires to carry them out," at least where such projects are not "considered to be of State concern" and do not involve the expenditure of state or federal funds. 1 5 -This conception suggests, at a minimum, that California could not impose a local preference statute on home rule entities undertaking self-financed public works projects.
CONCLUSION
Under a private-party definition of market participation, states enjoy immunity from the dormant Commerce Clause only when acting in a manner that could legally be undertaken by a private actor in the market. Reference to private action ensures of the state, home rule or otherwise . . . ." 1972 Alaska Sess Laws ch 113, § 4 ("An Act that states cannot use the exception indirectly to impose restraints on commerce which would be barred if imposed directly. At the same time, the private-party test allows states an avenue to meet the parochial demands inevitably placed upon them.
Applied to local preference statutes, the private-party model prompts two questions. First, the preference should be evaluated at a generic level. Unless a private party could have exercised such a preference, the dormant Commerce Clause must be applied. Second, state law should be examined to determine whether the state and its subdivisions can properly be considered the same actor. In this capacity, home rule provisions can provide a convenient test of subdivisions' actual level of autonomy.
Application of the private-party test demonstrates that the validity of local preference statutes under the dormant Commerce Clause depends in large part on individual states' law of local government. A state may impose a local preference if the state keeps its subdivisions reined in, but not if it has cut them a lot of slack. In turn, this conclusion implies that by amending their law of local government, states could reduce the federal constitutional obstacles to their ability to act in the market.
